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DIVISION OF PROPERTY IN SEPARATE
MAINTENANCE
MARIAN E. LOW*
Sec. 28, Chap. 56, Colo. Stat. Ann., provides inter alia as
follows:
• . . the court . . . may make reasonable orders for
temporary support, suit money or counsel fees . . . and
may, upon the entry of the decree of separate mainte-
nance, make such permanent orders, or may, in the
proper case, determine the property rights of the parties
or decree a division of property upon such terms and
conditions as the court shall deem just.
Should the "or" in each instance in the above quoted section
be read in the disjunctive, i.e., either support payments or a
division of property, or should it be read in the conjunctive so
as to allow both which is permitted in divorce decreesI by such
a construction? 2 There is no Colorado decision directly in point
answering this question.
It is the writer's contention that to give the wife both sup-
port money and a division of property under a separate mainte-
nance decree would be contrary to the underlying concept of
separate maintenance, and would be treating it as a divorce to
the extent that the property rights of the parties are affected
thereby.
Under the common law, if the husband failed or refused to
support his wife, she could buy necessaries upon his credit, if
she were able to find a tradesman who was willing to sell to her
on such precarious terms. All agreements for a separation were
void as against public policy because they were in derogation of
the marriage relationship. 3 It is apparent that the common law
remedy afforded to the wife was grossly inadequate.
When the ecclesiastical courts first devised the equitable rem-
edy of alimony, the husband was called upon to support the wife,
but only when she had no means of support.
4
The prevailing modern view is summarized in one of the
present day encyclopedias as follows:5
The purpose of a suit for separate maintenance is
to enforce specifically the general duty of the husband
to support the wife by obtaining an order or decree di-
recting certain definite payments to be made at regular
intervals for this purpose.
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
'Colo. Stat. Ann., Sec. 8, Chap. 56 (1935).
2 Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 505, 117 P. 2d 363 (1946).
1 Madden, Domestic Relations, Sec. 99.4
O'Neil v. O'Neil, 18 N. J. Misc. 82, 11 A. 2d 128 (1939).
6 42 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 614.
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In Coe v. Coe, a Massachusetts case, the court said, "Allow-
ance to the wife is made in recognition of the legal right of the
wife to be supported by her husband solely for the purpose of
providing for her support, and not for the purpose of a division
of their property or the husband's property." 0
In granting a division of the property in addition to the
regular payments, the court would be ignoring the fact that "al-
though a legal separation has been decreed, the marital relation-
ship still exists. It (decree) anticipates that a future reconcilia-
tion may be brought about." ' If the husband should die with
such a decree in effect, the wife still retains her legal status as
the spouse, for separate maintenance does not change the course
of inheritance. Thus the wife would benefit twice from a division
of the husband's property if the court had allowed such a division
at the time of the separate maintenance decree.
The benefits of the separate maintenance decree should not
be so large as to render separation attractive to the wife." The
decree differs from alimony in that ordinarily it is only temporary
relief for the present needs of the wife.9 The purpose is not to en-
rich the wife, but to provide suitable support and maintenance for
her, taking into consideration the manner in which she was ac-
customed to live with her husband and the husband's ability to
provide support.'0
PROVISIONS IN OTHER STATES
It might be instructive at this point to consider a highlighted
survey of other jurisdictions, to determine if the prevailing view
tends to support our contention. It would be helpful if there
were one state with a statute on separate maintenance the same
as Colorado's but such is not the case. There is a wide divergence
in the provisions of the various jurisdictions, ranging from one
extreme to the other.
Kansas is the one state that clearly permits a division of
the property and an adjudication of the property rights at the
time of the legal separation." As early as 1900,12 the Kansas Su-
preme Court stated that the division or disposition of the prop-
erty, and the relinquishment by one of any claim or interest,
actual or contingent, in the estate of the other by reason of the
marital relationship,, in a separate maintenance decree was not
contrary to public policy. The court has consistently followed this
theory. 13 Kansas obviously does not follow the theory that there
will be a future reconciliation, but that at the time of the separa-
1313 Mass 232, 46 N.E. 2d 1017 (1943).
' Decker v. Decker, 56 Mont. 338, 185 P. 168 (1919).
'Rhodes v. Rhodes, 92 N. J. Eq. 252, 114 A. 414 (1920).
9 Rhodes v. Rhodes, supra, note No. 8.
"Reeve v. Reeve, Mo. App., 160 S. W. 2d 804 (1942).
"General Statutes of Kansas Annotated, Art. 15, Sec. 60-1506, 1516 (1935).
1" King v. Mollohan, 61 Kan. 683, 60 P. 731 (1900).
"aE.G., Hardesty v. Hardesty, 115 Kan. 192, 222 P. 102 (1924); Wulf v.
Fitzpatrick, 124 Kan. 642, 261 P. 838 (1927).
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tion, because of health, religious factors, age or obstinacy, there
will never be a divorce; that the separation is permanent. There-
fore, a division of the property would seem only equitable to the
wife. It is also notable that there is an unusually large number
of separate maintenance actions brought in Kansas.
California also permits a division of property by the court
according to this section: " . . The court in granting the hus-
band or wife permanent support and maintenance of himself or
herself shall make the same disposition of the community prop-
erty . . . as would have been made if the marriage had been
dissolved." 14 Sec. 146 of the Cicil Code provides that at the
dissolution of a marriage, the community property shall be equally
divided.
In spite of the above clear language which permits the court
to adjudicate property rights at the rendition of separate mainte-
nance decrees, the court said in Blache v. Blache:
15
If the action is one for separation and maintenance,
a dissolution is not contemplated, the parties remain as
before, husband and wife. The rights of the wife in the
community property are not destroyed by the decree for
maintenance unless there is an agreed property settle-
ment or the court awards the community property in ac-
cordance with the statutes. In a maintenance action,
periodical payments, not an absolute allowance are ordi-
narily contemplated, though the court has the right to
order otherwise.
Thus, even the court with clear authority to divide the property
indicates it ordinarily would not want to do so.
Two other community property states, Idaho and Washington,
do not allow division because there is no statutory authority to
do so.16 The Idaho court pointed out that Idaho had no statute
similar to California's and reversed a lower court decree which
gave the wife all the property real and personal, both community
and separate.17 The Washington court in Cummings v. Cummings"8
upheld the separate maintenance decree but denied the division of
the community property. The court said: "The courts do not have
the power to dispose of community property when granting a
decree of separate maintenance but the extent of their jurisdic-
tion is to impose liens to secure the payment of any award which
may be made."
The Illinois statute seems to be a more typical separate main-
tenance provision.' 9 It provides for an award for reasonable sup-
' California Civil Code, Sec. 137.
1'Blache v. Blache, 69 Cal. 2d 616, 160 P. 2d 136 (1945).
' Idaho Civil Code, Sec. 14-103.301 (1932); Washington Rem. Rev. Stat.,
Sec. 6890.
"'Radermacher v. Radermacher, 59 Ida. 716, 87 P. 2d 461 (1939).
IsCummings v. Cummings, 20 Wash. 2d 703, 149 P. 2d 155 (1944).
"Smith-Hurd Stat., Chap. 68, Sec. 22 (1935).
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port and maintenance while husband and wife live apart. The
court is to take into consideration the condition in life of the par-
ties at the place and residence of the wife or husband, and the
circumstances of the respective cases. There is no mention of
an adjudication of property or power to settle property rights.
However, there are some Illinois cases where the property
was divided. In Decker v. Decker property rights were settled
on the theory that the husband had abandoned the wife without
her fault.20 In Cox v. Cox, the court said that the property of the
the husband could bear the burden of providing for support of
his wife, where he had left the state. 21 In the Ribegard case the
court stated that the usual rule was that property rights should
not be adjusted, but in this case the parties themselves asked for
an adjudication.22  These various exceptions illustrate how the
Colorado statute could be applied if the "ors" were construed in
the alternative. Where the husband is not available to provide
support or has no income or ability to work, then if he has prop-
erty it should be made available for the wife's support. This
construction also gives some meaning to the Colorado statutory
language "in the proper case."
The Ohio statute 23 provides inter alia, that the court is al-
lowed to give alimony out of H's property, as is equitable which
may be allowed in real or personal property, or both, payable
either in gross or installments. In a 1922 case 24 the court would
not decree a division of property on the basis that there might
be future reconciliation. In 1933 25 the court would not give the
wife one car in addition to periodic payments when the husband
had two, saying the car was not necessary for her reasonable
support. In 1949 26 in refusing a property division the court rec-
ognized that in a suit for alimony alone, the court is much more
limited than in a divorce case. In a very recent case, 27 when the
lower court had awarded the wife ninety dollars a week and
ordered the husband to transfer one-half interest in the family
dwelling to the wife, the Supreme Court sustained the decree,
and stated:
Sec. 11998 clearly provides that in granting separate
support to the wife the court may allow alimony payable
in real or personal property. . . . Here the court granted,
as alimony, the husband's one-half interest in the family
dwelling as well as weekly payments of money. Such
-279 Ill. 300, 116 N.E. 688 (1917).
- 192 Ill. App. 286 (1916).
21 Ribegard v. Ribegard, 349 Ill. App. 99, 110 N.E. 2d 89 (1953).
23 Pages Ohio General Code, Sec. 11998.
24 Durham v. Durham, 104 Ohio St. 7, 135 N.E. 280.
25 Daily v. Daily, 48 Ohio App. 83, 192 N.E. 287.
24Neal v. Neal, Ohio Com. Pl., 85 N.E. 2d 147 (1949).
' Glassman v. Glassman, Ohio App., 103 N.E. 2d 781 (1951).
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an award is not a division of the property as claimed by
defendant. Unquestionably, the court found that pro-
viding the wife the right to the family dwelling as a
place to live was more desirable than increasing the money
award to provide for housing of the family elsewhere.
Michigan, 28 Kentucky, 29 and Tennessee 0 seemed to have had
this situation in view for by their respective statutes the wife is
allowed the use and possession of the husband's property although
not title to it. To illustrate: in Michigan in 1951,'1 Mrs. Mackie
was awarded $300 per month and the use of the home owned
jointly, with Mr. Mackie paying the taxes and insurance. The
court said, "In a statutory proceeding for separate maintenance
the courts do not award the wife title to any of the husband's
property. In determining a proper allowance for the wife, the
court should take into consideration the husband's income, the
age and health of both parties, the station in life, and manner of
living of the parties prior to the separation."
Some of the other states which do not allow a division of
property at the time of the separate maintenance decree are:
Massachusetts 2 Florida,33 Maryland 4 New Hampshire, 35 West Vir-
ginia,31 and Montana .3  The Montana court said, "a reconciliation
may be effected, and the marital relations resumed, and any de-
cree which is made is subject to alteration or modification any
time. To sustain a division of property would put it beyond the
power of the court to make any further order in respect to the
property."
Although the decisions by the courts of the other jurisdic-
tions do not have any application to separate maintenance actions
in Colorado, since the matter is governed by statute, they do
reflect, for the most part, an attitude that conforms to the under-
lying principle that separate maintenance entitles the wife to
reasonable support only, and does not warrant both support and
a division of the property.
CONCLUSION
At the outset the question was raised as to whether the "ors"
in Sec. 28 should be read in the conjunctive or the disjunctive.
The author has attempted to show that because of the basic con-
cept of separate maintenance, and the views expressed by the
other jurisdictions, they should be read in the disjunctive.
'Michigan Compiled Laws, Sees. 552.301, 552.302 (1948).
2 Kentucky Revised Statutes, Sec. 403.060.
' Williams Tennessee Code Anno., Sec. 8446 (1934).
Mackie v. Mackie, 329 Mich. 595, 46 N.W. 2d 393 (1951).
Dunnington v. Dunnington, 324 Mass. 610, 87 N.E. 2d 847 (1949).
Lamoureaux v. Lamoureaux, Fla., 25 So. 2d 859 (1946).
S4Nicodemus v. Nicodemus, 120 Md. 584, 48 A. 2d 442 (1946).
Pflug v. Pflug, 92 N.H. 247, 47 A. 2d 829 (1946).
'Davis v. Davis, W. Va. 70 S.E. 2d 889 (1952).
11 Decker v. Decker, 56 Mont. 338, 185 P. 168 (1919).
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Any doubt cast on our opinion would come from an attorney
for a wife who wanted a division of the property in addition to
periodic payments in a separate maintenance action, and who
relied on the case of Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 505, 117 P. 2d
363, a 1946 case in which the court construed the divorce section,
Sec. 8, Chap. 56, 35 C. S. A. This section provides for the court
to decree alimony "or" a division of the property. The court held
that the conjunction "or" should be construed synonymous with
"and" so that payments or alimony, and a division of property
could be made. The court stated: "There is nothing to indicate
that the legislative intent was to restrict the court or give its
authority only in the alternative. It appears rather to indicate
an intent specifically to grant full authority in the court to make
just provision for the wife and children."
Because of the inherent difference between the action for
divorce and separate maintenance, it is the feeling of this writer
that this construction should be limited in it application to Sec. 8
and not applied to Sec. 28. Divorce is final; separate maintenance
is not. The marital relationship is not over and ended and the
court should not treat the property as if it were.
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